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1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624–25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
2. Using America as an example, suits against the controversial Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act were filed within minutes of President Obama signing the Health Care Bill into law. Many are
hoping that the Supreme Court can end the controversy. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Cuccinelli Forges His
Own Path in Suing U.S. Government over Law, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2010, at A01; John Schwartz,
Health Measure’s Opponents Plan Legal Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at 20; Mike
Wereschagin, Line Forms to Challenge Health Care Overhaul Bill, PITT. TRIB.-REV., Mar. 23, 2010, at
A1.
3. The European Court of Human Rights is currently considering Ireland’s abortion regulations.
Statement of Facts, A., B. & C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed July 15, 2005), available
at http://www.eclj.org/PDF/081118_ECLJ_StatementofFacts7May2008.pdf. The United Kingdom has
considered and reconsidered cases about the legality of transporting a close relative to Switzerland for
assisted suicide without fear of legal repercussions upon return to England. Pretty v. DPP, [2001] UKHL
61, [2002] 1 All ER 1 (appeal taken from Eng.); R. v. DPP, [2009] UKHL 45 (appeal taken from Eng.).
A United States court is considering whether a referendum defining marriage to mean one man and one
woman is unconstitutional in Perry v. Schwarzenegger. See Editorial, The Public and Prop. 8, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2010, at 18; Max Fisher, Proposition 8 Court Challenge: Too Risky?, THE ATLANTIC WIRE
(Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Proposition-8-Court-Challenge-
Too-Risky-2139.
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SHIFTING TOWARDS A EUROPEAN ROE v. WADE:
SHOULD JUDICIAL ACTIVISM CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL
RIGHT TO ABORTION WITH A., B. AND C. v. IRELAND?
Emma Finney†
[The] view, in a nutshell, is that every major social ill in this country can find its cure
in some Constitutional “principle” and that this Court should “take the lead” in
promoting reform when other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution
is not a panacea for every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court,
ordained as a judicial body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.1
Increasingly, countries are beginning to look to their respective judiciary
to be the keeper of morality and the final voice on difficult complex issues.2
Whether dissatisfaction with the legislative process or simply a willingness on
the part of the judiciary to shape the culture, advocates for socially progressive
norms have repeatedly invoked the power of the courts to affect changes in the
culture outside of the democratic processes.  These causes are characterized3
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4. See George C. Christie, On the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1314
n.10 (1990) (“[. . .] the temptation to equate legal obligations and moral obligations might arise even in a
less-than-perfect society”). See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum,
64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (1952) (“Holmes is telling us . . . that we ought to see morality as the source
of law rather than its content. The first part of the talk, in other words, explains what law really
is—something entirely separate from morals, and the second part what it should become—something which
involves morals.”) (citing Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV.
529, 541–42 (1951)).
5. JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 250–62 (1991).
6.
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the
Constitution protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, Roe [. . .],
that definition of liberty is still questioned. Joining the respondents as amicus curiae, the
United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last decade, again asks us to overrule
Roe.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Further,
In the present cases, however, as our analysis to this point makes clear, the terrible price would
be paid for overruling. Our analysis would not be complete, however, without explaining why
overruling Roe’s central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles
of stare decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court’s capacity to exercise the judicial power
and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law.
Id. at 864–65.
And,
Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as
to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable
cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is
the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the
by the moral dimension of their scope, and distinguished largely by the
relative absence of any positive legal foundation upon which adjudication can
be made. Despite this, with escalating frequency courts are being urged to
decide divisive issues once for all. Now, with the appearance of A., B. and C.
v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights is presented with the same
jurisprudential problem. People often equate legality with morality.  This4
practice belies confusion of legal and moral authority; of democratic and legal
force.
In the United States, the combatants of the culture wars have made
considerable efforts to reshape the moral landscape through the coercive
power of the courts.  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.5
Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrated its willingness to have the last
word on the abortion debate and the majority revealed that they valued a
desire to retain a position of power over a chance to reconsider the plight of
the unborn, even after the United States Department of Justice repeatedly
requested they do so.  As a rule in democracies, legislatures are the branches6
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contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.
. . . But whatever the premises of opposition may be, only the most convincing justification
under accepted standards of precedent could suffice to demonstrate that a later decision
overruling the first was anything but a surrender to political pressure, and an unjustified
repudiation of the principle on which the Court staked its authority in the first instance. So to
overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed
decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.
The country’s loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be underscored by an equally
certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing in overruling unnecessarily and
under pressure. . . .
The Court’s duty in the present cases is clear. In 1973, it confronted the already-divisive
issue of governmental power to limit personal choice to undergo abortion, for which it provided
a new resolution based on the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether
or not a new social consensus is developing on that issue, its divisiveness is no less today than
in 1973, and pressure to overrule the decision, like pressure to retain it, has grown only more
intense. A decision to overrule Roe’s essential holding under the existing circumstances would
address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage to the
Court’s legitimacy, and to the Nation’s commitment to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative
to adhere to the essence of Roe’s original decision, and we do so today.
Id. at 867–69 (emphasis added). This language seems to suggest that if the societal pressure had been
absent, the court would have been free to overrule, but because people vigorously protested the decision the
court could not even consider looking at the plight of the unborn.
7. DELOS FRANKLIN WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE 9 (1912). For further discussion
on the branches of government accountability as well as checks and balances see The Federalist No. 51
(James Madison).
8. For example, “many members of Congress who voted for or otherwise facilitated passage of the
MCA [Military Commissions Act] likely did so with the intent that, as Senator Specter said, the courts
would ‘clean it up.’” Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The
Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 281, 283 (2008) (footnote omitted) (quoting 152
CONG. REC. S10263 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of Sen. Specter).
9. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
which remain most directly responsible to the people or masses.  Legislators7
often leave contentious issues to the judiciary to solve so that they can avoid
taking a stand which would alienate a large number of their constituents.8
While convenient, this raises significant concerns. United States Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out the absurdity in allowing the
judiciary to amass such power and to decide such vitally important issues
when he said in his Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health concurrence,
the point at which life becomes “worthless,” and the point at which the means
necessary to preserve it become “extraordinary” or “inappropriate,” are neither set
forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine justices of this Court any better than
they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone
directory.9
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10. For example, “Congress found, among other things, that ‘[a] moral, medical, and ethical
consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane
procedure that is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.’” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
141 (2007). And yet, the Judges upheld several equivalent procedures. Id. at 166–67; Shaun de Freitas &
Emma Finney, Modernity, the Judiciary, and Christian Benevolence Towards the Unborn, TYDSKRIFVIR
CHRISTELIKE WETENSKAP, 1ste & 2de Kwartaal 2010, at 30, 31. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (invalidated
provisions prohibiting the use of saline amniocentesis abortion procedure, and requiring those performing
abortions to exercise professional skill and care to preserve the life of the fetus); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379 (1979) (struck down a Pennsylvania statute that required physicians use the abortion technique
that provided the best opportunity for the fetus to be born alive in abortions after viability); City of Akron
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (invalidating provisions of a Pennsylvania statute
requiring the physicians give their patients informed consent materials on fetal development and medical
risks of abortion and that the physician use the method most likely to preserve the life of the a viable unborn
child); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000).
11. Ireland, if it chose to take extraordinary measures, technically could choose to withdraw from
the Council of Europe rather than follow the court’s ruling or refuse to abide by the ruling and risk
expulsion by the Council of Europe. Ireland could also choose to withdraw from the European Union if that
became necessary.
Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly makes provision for the voluntary secession of a
Member State from the EU. Specifically, the exit clause provides that a Member State wishing
to withdraw from the EU must inform the European Council of its intention; the Council is to
produce guidelines on the basis of which a withdrawal agreement is to be negotiated with that
Member State; and the Council, acting by a qualified majority and after obtaining the consent
of the European Parliament, will conclude the agreement on behalf of the EU. The withdrawing
Member State would cease to be bound by the treaties either from the date provided for in the
withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after notification of its intention to withdraw.
Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, 10 LEGAL
WORKING PAPER SERIES 1, 23 (Dec. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1517760 (Although
Ireland would hypothetically be allowed to leave, it would not be an easy process.). The process for
voluntarily withdrawing from the Council of Europe is somewhat more straightforward. Under Article 7
of the Statute of the Council of Europe,
Any member of the Council of Europe may withdraw by formally notifying the Secretary
General of its intention to do so. Such withdrawal shall take effect at the end of the financial
year in which it is notified, if the notification is given during the first nine months of that
financial year. If the notification is given in the last three months of the financial year, it shall
take effect at the end of the next financial year.
Yet on the abortion issue, most of the decisions have been left to the courts
which uniformly have demonstrated a lack of sensitivity towards the unborn.10
This year, in proceedings before the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seventeen judges will have the chance to
respect Ireland’s domestic sovereignty and its constitutional amendment
protecting unborn life or, in a step of judicial activism, essentially force
Ireland to create a right to abortion.  On December 9, 2009, the case was11
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Statute of the Council of Europe, art. 7, May 5, 1949, CETS No. 001, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm (allowing Ireland to choose to withdraw from
the Council to avoid having to comply with an ECHR ruling finding Ireland’s Constitutional Amendment
a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights).
12. The exception being if the ECHR chooses to issue an advisory opinion. See Basic Information
on Procedures, EUR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/How+the+
Court+works/Procedure+before+the+Court/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
13. Tom Heneghan, Could Irish Abortion Case Lead to a “European Roe v. Wade”?, FAITH
WORLD (Dec. 10, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2009/12/10/could-irish-abortion-case-lead-to-
a-european-roe-v-wade/ (“the decision will . . . be a landmark event because it could set a precedent on
whether access to abortion is a basic human right in Europe”); Hilary White, Human Rights Court Case
Could Be Europe’s Roe. v. Wade, LIFESITENEWS.COM (July 14, 2009), http://www.lifesitenews.com/
ldn/2009/jul/09071406.html.
14. White, supra note 13; see, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002);
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958). The confirmation of Elena Kagan only increases the expectancy that the Supreme Court
will continue to rely on international law as in her confirmation hearings she stated that “[t]here are some
cases in which the citation of foreign law, or international law, might be appropriate,” in response to a
question from Sen. Chuck Grassley. Confirmation Hearing on The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://www.lexisnexis.com (search “Kagan
nomination” for “June 29, 2010” under “CQ transcriptions” database). Grassley continued: “If confirmed,
would you rely on or cite international foreign law when you decide cases?” Id. She added that she is “in
favor of good ideas coming from wherever you can get them” and said “there are a number of
circumstances” when foreign law might be appropriate. Id. Her appointment increases the chances that if
an international right to abortion is found in A., B and C v. Ireland the court may use that precedent in
reconsidering a case about whether indigent women have a Constitutional right to federally funded
abortions. Justice Ginsburg commented in a recent interview about her belief that Roe was originally “going
to be then set up for Medicaid funding for abortion” and her belief that reproductive choice needs to be
straightened out so that there is not a policy which only affects poor women. Emily Bazelon, The Place of
Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2009, at MM22. One of Kagan’s judicial heroes Justice
Thurgood Marshall stated in his dissent to Harris v. McRae, “that denial of a Medicaid-funded abortion
is equivalent to denial of legal abortion altogether.” 448 U.S. 297, 338 (1980).
heard. As decisions of the Grand Chamber are binding on all lower courts and
all member states,  A., B. and C. v. Ireland has the potential to affect policy12
for all Council of Europe members.  As legal counsel from the European13
Centre for Law and Justice and Roger Kiska, a third party intervener in the
case, pointed out “the case is not only pivotal in Europe; it is pivotal in
America as well . . . . With ever-greater frequency, American courts have
considered what other countries are doing when deciding their own cases.”14
Through a comparison to the United States experience of a judicially created
right to abortion, a discussion of the procedural irregularities and the lack of
merit to the alleged violations of the European Convention of Human Rights,
and an examination of the current absence of international law or treaties
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15. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocol No. 11, arts. 34–36, ratified Nov. 1, 1998, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights], available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm.
16. Id.
17. Statement of Facts at The Facts § (A)(1), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
18. Id. §§ A(1)–(3). A consultant in the case, William Saunders pointed out that the reference to the
unintentional nature of the pregnancies is surprising, writing, “What relevance is the ‘intent’ to create a
human being to Ireland’s right to protect its life once created?” William Saunders, The Roe v. Wade of
Europe, NAT. REV. ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2009), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/49423/i-roe-i-v-
i-wade-i-europe/william-saunders.
19. Statement of Facts at The Facts § A(1), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
20. Id.
recognizing a right to abortion, this article will present a case for the wisdom
of judicial restraint and respect for the margin of appreciation doctrine.
I. THE HUMAN FACES TO THE CASE PRODUCE AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE TO
THE ISSUE
At stake in this international case is Ireland’s constitutional amendment
protecting unborn life. The Court will have to decide whether the amendment,
which renders the plaintiffs effectively unable to terminate their pregnancies
within Ireland, infringes on the plaintiffs’ human rights under the European
Convention of Human Rights. However, courts rarely examine laws in a
vacuum. There must be a case and controversy in order to be heard.  A party15
must challenge a law based on an experience in order to raise an issue.  It is16
the recitation of the human stories that tug at the heartstrings and illustrate the
hardships these three particular women faced in their decisions to terminate
their pregnancies.
Due to the facts’ emotive appeal to the media, and indeed to the judges
hearing the case, it is important to keep the facts in mind when considering the
case. Interestingly, one of the three applicants in the case is not Irish. The
applicants are two female Irish nationals and one female Lithuanian national
who resides in Ireland.  All three of the applicants in this case allege that they17
became pregnant unintentionally,  but otherwise each has a unique story to18
tell.
The first applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic, unmarried,
unemployed, and impoverished mother of four.  She had recently19
reestablished contact with her four children who were in foster care and feared
that a new sibling would endanger the reunification of her family.  Therefore,20
she made the decision to travel to England and procure an abortion there,
overcoming the hurdles of insufficient funds, international travel, and doing
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21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Applicants’ Reply to the Observations of Ireland on the Admissibility and Merits at 4, A., B. and
C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. filed on Dec. 23, 2008).
25. In an ectopic pregnancy the fetus develops outside the uterus. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
438 (Mark Boyer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1985).
26. Statement of Facts at The Facts § A(2), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
27. Id.; see generally Gary Culliton, Doctors Advised on Morning-After Pill, IRISH MEDICAL TIMES
(Apr. 27, 2009), http://www.imt.ie/news/medico-legal/2009/04/doctors-advised-on-morning-after-pill.html
(explaining that emergency contraception is available in Ireland for adults, though a doctor’s general
prescription is required and that Irish courts are moving toward a standard which would allow women as
young as sixteen to obtain a prescription).
28. Applicants’ Reply at 5, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
29. Statement of Facts at The Facts § A(2), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
30. Applicants’ Reply at 5, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
31. Statement of Facts at The Facts § A(2), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
32. Statement of Facts at The Facts § A(3), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
33. Id.
it secretly “without missing a contact visit with her children.”  Upon her21
return, she experienced “pain, nausea and bleeding for eight to nine weeks.”22
Knowing about the prohibition on abortion, she feared contacting a doctor for
medical advice.  Despite her concerns, she was treated without incident at an23
Irish hospital for an incomplete abortion and underwent a dilation and
curettage.  Dissatisfied with current Irish law, A brought suit before the24
ECHR.
The second applicant, B, was single and at risk for an ectopic pregnancy25
when she decided to travel to England to obtain an abortion.  Her risk for an26
ectopic pregnancy developed as a common side effect of the failure of the
“morning after pill” emergency contraception B had taken.  B admits that by27
the time she had her abortion, she knew that she did not in fact have an ectopic
pregnancy, and that her decision to have an abortion was made prior to
learning of the possible medical condition.  Upon her return to Ireland she28
“started passing blood clots,” but, afraid to seek medical advice in Ireland, she
returned to England for a medical exam.  Despite her alleged fear, B also29
received follow-up care at a Dublin clinic without incident.  B alleges that30
“the impossibility for her to have an abortion in Ireland made the procedure
unnecessarily expensive, complicated and traumatic.”  Therefore, she brought31
suit to the ECHR.
The third applicant, C, was a cancer patient whose cancer had gone into
remission.  Before becoming aware of her pregnancy, C underwent a series32
of tests to determine her state of health, which could have affected the fetus.33
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34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. In fact Ireland finds the protection of the unborn so compelling that they passed a Constitutional
Amendment guaranteeing the unborn absolute protection throughout pregnancy within Ireland’s borders
unless there is a risk to the life of the mother. See IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3 (amended 1983), available
at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/eng/Youth_Zone/About_the_Constitution,_Flag,_Anthem_Harp/
Constitution_of_Ireland_March_2010.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2010). Additionally, Ireland’s government
is vigorously defending its Constitution in this case and seeking to prevent the proposed Council of Europe
resolution, “Access to Safe and Legal Abortion.” See Observations of Ireland on the Third Party
Unable to find a doctor who would make a determination that her life was at
risk if the pregnancy continued and uncertain of the potential damage to the
fetus, she chose to go to England for an abortion.  The United Kingdom34
would not assist her in a medical abortion due to the need for follow-up
medical care, so C waited eight weeks in order to be eligible for a surgical
abortion causing her “emotional distress and fear for her health.”  Upon her35
return to Ireland, C suffered “the complications of an incomplete abortion,
including prolonged bleeding and infection.”  After the experience, C chose36
to sue in the ECHR.
When read together, these three stories put a face on the very real cost to
women imposed by Ireland’s constitutional amendment protecting unborn life.
If their stories are framed in the light most favorable to their point of view—a
recovering alcoholic struggling to put her life back on track to care for her
four young children, a single woman alone facing a risky ectopic pregnancy,
and a courageous cancer survivor battling for her life and simultaneously
worrying about the damage she may have already unwittingly caused the
fetus—they create a compelling tale of the struggles of Irish women
unwillingly or unintentionally pregnant. Yet, is the cost to Irish women
prohibitively high?
Do their hardships rise to a level which violates their basic human rights
under the European Convention of Human Rights? Is this a case where it is
necessary for the Grand Chamber of the ECHR to intervene with Ireland’s
domestic policy and overturn a constitutional amendment put in place by
referendum in 1983, irrevocably altering Ireland’s prolife policies, and
simultaneously creating an international precedent of a right to abortion for
all Council of Europe Member States?
When answering the above questions, it is important to remember that the
three women’s lives are not the only ones in the case. There are three
additional faces in this case that Ireland would have the ECHR recognize and
Ireland finds their stories compelling.  For the purposes of this article they37
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Observations at 3–7, appendix A and B, A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R.,
Dec. 19, 2008).
38. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3.3 (amended 1983), available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/
eng/Youth_Zone/About_the_Constitution,_Flag,_Anthem_Harp/Constitution_of_Ireland_March_2010.pdf
(last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
39. Id.
40. See European Convention of Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 53 (“Safeguard for Existing
Human Rights: Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the
human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting
Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.”).
41. Peter Singer describes his logic about infants: “Human babies are not born self-aware or capable
of grasping their lives over time. They are not persons. Hence their lives would seem to be no more worthy
of protection than the life of a fetus.” PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 210 (Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1994). When Singer was confronted by a disabled
advocacy group “[a]t a Princeton Forum, Singer remarked that he would have supported the parents of his
disabled protestors if they had sought to kill their disabled offspring in infancy.” DONALD DE MARCO &
BENJAMIN WIKER, ARCHITECTS OF THE CULTURE OF DEATH 371 (2004). See also MICHAEL TOOLEY,
ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE 411 (1983) (“New-born humans are neither persons nor even quasi-persons,
and their destruction is in no way intrinsically wrong.”).
will be referred to as D, E, and F. They are the three fetuses whose lives were
abruptly and tragically brought to an end by A, B, and C’s individual decision
to procure an abortion. Ireland’s Constitution mandates that their right to life
be respected, considered, and balanced with the women’s hardships.  The38
provision reads, “[t]he State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and,
with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that
right.”  Ireland’s provision struggles to balance the rights of the unborn39
person and the mother while recognizing that the basic right to life enshrined
in Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights takes primacy over
all other rights. Ireland’s conception of the unborn considers six sympathetic
individuals in the case instead of limiting its scope to only the three women.
As that is a decision that widens and broadens protections and maintains the
historical understanding of human life, it is a decision that should be
respected.40
If Ireland was choosing to limit or narrow the definition of life by, for
instance, adopting philosopher Peter Singer’s definition of what type of
human life warrants protection with a constitutional amendment, the ECHR
would be more than justified in intervening to correct Ireland’s exclusion of
infants and the disabled from the list of persons entitled to life.  The Court’s41
intervention in such a situation would be consistent with the worldwide trend
towards universal protection of human life and the elimination of
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42. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; Statute of the International Tribunal, art. 2, May 25, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1192; European Human Rights Convention, supra note 15; Records of the UNESCO General
Conference, Paris, Fr., Oct. 21–Nov. 7, 1997, Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation
towards the Future Generation, vol. 1 Resolutions, 69–71; International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 93;
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III)A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71
(1948).
43. Doctors are clearly authorized to perform abortions in Ireland when the life of the mother is at
stake. See, e.g., The Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.); McGee v. The Attorney General, [1974]
I.R. 284 (Ir.). See also MEDICAL COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO ETHICAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR § 24.6 (2004)
(“The Council recognises that termination or pregnancy can occur when there is real and substantial risk
to the life of the mother . . . .”).
44. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 3 (declaring the right to be free from
inhumane and degrading treatment); id. art. 2 (declaring the right to life); id. art. 8 (declaring the right to
privacy); id. art. 14 (declaring equal treatment under the Convention regardless of sex or status).
discrimination.  Why the Court should intervene to refuse Ireland’s protection42
of biologically human fetuses’ right to life is far less easy to determine and
indeed is arguably an indefensible position.
II. THE WOMEN’S HARDSHIPS ARE NOT A VIOLATION OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
These three women allege that Ireland’s Constitutional Amendment
which effectively prevents them from procuring an elective abortion in
Ireland  violates their basic human rights and thus the European Convention43
of Human Rights. Specifically, the women allege violations of four provisions
of the Convention: the right to bodily integrity and privacy, the right to be free
from torture or degrading treatment, the right to life, and the prohibition of
discrimination.  I argue that each and every claim fails on its merits as none44
of the claims rise to the level of European Convention of Human Rights
protections.
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45. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 8.1 (“Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.”); id. art. 8.2 (“There shall be no
interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”).
46. Statement of Facts at Complaints, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
47. Statement of Facts at Questions to the Parties § 2, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
48. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27 (1992); Joint
Written Observations of Third Party Interveners at 7, A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (Eur. Ct.
H.R., Nov. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Observations of Third Party Interveners].
49. Observations of Third Party Interveners, supra note 48, at 6.
A. The Applicants’ Article 8 Claims Fail
First, the women allege that their right to privacy in all family, home, and
personal interests was violated, and that Ireland’s abortion ban interferes with
their entitlement to freedom from public interference from any public
authority in exercising this right.  The women also listed in their complaint45
that:
[T]he national law on abortion was not sufficiently clear and precise, since the
Constitutional term “unborn” was vague and since the criminal prohibition was open
to different interpretations. The fact that it was open to women—provided they had
sufficient resources—to travel outside Ireland to have an abortion defeated the aim
of the restriction and the fact that abortion was available in Ireland only in very
limited circumstances was disproportionate and excessive.46
In the Grand Chamber of the ECHR’s response to this count of the complaint,
the Grand Chamber reframed the claim by requesting the parties prepare
arguments on whether “in the particular circumstances of each applicant’s
case, did the national legal position concerning abortion interfere with her
rights under Article 8 of the Convention? If so, was the interference provided
for by law, did it pursue a legitimate aim and was it proportionate to that
aim?”  I argue, based on the following paragraphs, that the Irish law is47
proportionate to the legitimate aim. It is noteworthy that the ECHR has
concluded in earlier cases that, “the protection in Ireland of the right to life of
the unborn both” serve a “legitimate aim” and are proportionally tailored and
necessary in a democratic society.48
Ireland responds to the women’s complaint by observing that the Article
8 guarantee is not absolute within the context of pregnancy, and that by
definition pregnancy is not a wholly private matter.  Indeed, the ECHR has49
recognized the limitation on Article 8 within the context of pregnancy in prior
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50. See, e.g., Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 12, 80 (2005) (“[T]he issue has
always been determined by weighing up various, and sometimes conflicting, rights or freedoms claimed
by a woman, a mother or a father in relation to one another or vis-à-vis an unborn child.”); Brüggemann
and Scheuten v. Fed. Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 244, 253 54 (1977)
(“Article 8 § 1 cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination are, as a principle,
solely a matter of the private life of the mother.”).
51. See Kruslin v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (ser. A) at 24–25. See also Evans v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 6339/05, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21, 77 (2007) (“A number of factors must be taken into account when
determining the breadth of the margin of appreciation to be enjoyed by the State in any case under Article
8. Where a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake, the margin
allowed to the State will be restricted (see, for example, X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 26 March
1985, Series A no. 91, §§ 24 and 27; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series
A no. 45; Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 90, ECHR 2002-VI; cf. Pretty,
cited above, § 71). Where, however, there is no consensus within the Member States of the Council of
Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best means of protecting it,
particularly where the case raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider (X., Y. and Z.
v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 April 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, § 44;
Frette v. France, no. 36515/97, § 41, ECHR 2002-I; Christine Goodwin, cited above, § 85; see also mutatis
mutandis, Vo, cited above, § 82). There will also usually be a wide margin if the State is required to strike
a balance between competing private and public interests or Convention rights (see Odièvre, §§ 44–49 and
Frette § 42).”); Huvig v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (ser. A) at 52–53 (1990); Handyside v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 48–49 (1976), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/EN/hudoc.; JEAN-FRANCOIS RENUCCI, DROIT EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 329
(LGDJ/Montchrestien 2002) (1999).
52. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 6, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
53. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.”) (citations omitted).
case law.  Applying the margin of appreciation doctrine then, the ECHR is50
to give sovereign states leeway in allowing their national authorities to
determine the circumstances warranting restrictions on guaranteed rights.51
Ireland’s view of the right to life places both the woman and the child in the
pregnancy on equal footing and deference to Ireland’s decision that the Article
2 right to life justifies a limitation with adequate safeguards on the woman’s
Article 8 right should “outweigh[ ] any alleged conflicts with the interests of
women to health, privacy and bodily integrity.”  Although perhaps not as52
strong of an argument, Ireland could also point to the growing recognition that
the long term aftereffects of abortion can have a negative effect on women and
thus Ireland, by banning abortions, is protecting the women’s health.  The53
ECHR should consider Ireland’s attempt to balance privacy and health when
deciding whether Ireland violates the women’s Article 8 right.
If the ECHR should determine that Ireland’s national position on abortion
interfered with the women’s Article 8 right, then the second question will be
addressed. The Court will need to determine whether “Ireland’s restriction on
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54. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 6, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05; cf. Huvig v.
France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (ser. A) at 52–53 (1990); Kruslin v. France, 176 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (ser. A) at
24–25.
55. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.3; Offences Against the Person Act, 1861, 24–25 Vict., c. 100 § 58–59
(Ir.); Civil Liability Act § 58 (No. 41/1961) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1961/en/
act/pub/0041/index.html; Health (Family Planning) Act § 10 (No. 20/1979) (Ir.), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1979/en/act/pub/0020/index.html.
56. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 6, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05; cf. Sunday
Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 278–79 et seq. (1979).
57. Applicants’ Reply at 24, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
58. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 164 (1979).
59. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 6, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
60. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 8, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (“[Sixty-eight]
countries worldwide prohibit abortion entirely or allow it only to save the mother’s life.”). The 68 include
four other signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights. Also, there is no internationally
recognized right to abortion in existence in international law or treaty. “Pro-abortion groups cannot find an
international right to abortion and so are forced to cite only non-binding, ungratified interpretations by
unelected compliance committees. These carry no weight.” Id. at 9.
61. An additional factor to consider is the
question of which women's health counts in the calculus. Somewhat more than half of the
unborn children killed in abortion are women. . . . [A]ll over the world and increasingly in
Western nations, female unborn children are selected for abortion precisely because they are
women and not men, in a practice that the UNFPA calls “female infanticide.”
Observations of Third Party Interveners at 9, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05; United Nations, Report of
the International Conference on Population and Development (1995), http://www.unfpa.org/public/
home/sitemap/icpd/International-Conference-on-Population-and-Development/ICPD-Programme.
62. Ireland’s maternal mortality rate is the lowest in Europe, while the rate is three times higher in
England, which has very liberal abortion laws. See Niall Hunter, Ireland’s Death Rates Improving,
http://www.irishhealth.com/index.html?level=4&id=13789 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). See World Health
Organization, Maternal Mortality in 2005: Estimates Developed by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, and the
World Bank 23–27 (2007), available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2007/
abortion is prescribed by law, is precise enough and reasonably foresees its
consequences, and provides adequate safeguards against arbitrary interference
with respective substantive rights.”  There is no dispute that Ireland’s54
restrictions on abortion are prescribed by law.  The Irish law must also pursue55
a legitimate aim which is proportional to its necessity in a democratic society
and its ability to meet a pressing social need.  In fact, the applicants expressly56
concede that “the State’s action was in accordance with the law, and had a
legitimate aim of protecting fetal life.”  “The laws must be based on just57
reasons which are relevant, sufficient,  and concrete.”  Restrictions on58 59
abortion are compatible with the requirements of a democratic society.60
Prevention of abortion can also include the protection of the health, bodily
integrity, and privacy of women.  Although occasionally presumed, it is not61
a foregone conclusion that legalized abortion necessarily results in the
improved health of women.  Numerous studies by mainstream health62
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9789241596213_eng.pdf. A New Zealand 25-year longitudinal study found that young women “having an
abortion had elevated rates of subsequent mental health problems including depression, anxiety, suicidal
behaviours and substance use disorders. This association persisted after adjustment for confounding
factors.” D.M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16, 16 (2006). An international study conducted in 2004 showed that the death
rate from abortion was “three times higher in Finland and 1.6 to 2 times higher in California, than the death
rate from childbirth.” Observations of Third Party Interveners at 10, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05. See
Mika Gissler et al., Pregnancy-Associated Mortality After Birth, Spontaneous Abortion or Induced
Abortion in Finland, 1987–2000, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 422, 422 (2004). David C.
Reardon et al., Deaths Associated with Abortion Compared to Childbirth: A Review of New and Old Data
and the Medical and Legal Implications, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 279, 280 (2004). Abortion
also causes a risk to the mother and child in subsequent pregnancies. Brent Rooney, Induced Abortion and
Risk of Later Premature Births, 8 J. AM. PHYSICIANS. & SURGEONS 46, 46 (2003).
63. See note supra 62.
64. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 8, 27 (1992);
Observations of Third Party Interveners at 7, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
65. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 8 (emphasis added).
66. The ECHR concluded,
[T]hat the protection afforded under Irish law to the right of life of the unborn is based on
profound moral values concerning the nature of life which were reflected in the stance of the
majority of the Irish People against abortion as expressed in the 1983 referendum. The
restriction thus pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of morals of which the protection
in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn is one aspect.
Open Door and Dublin Well Woman, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27.
67. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 8, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
professionals, governments, and universities link abortion to increased health
risks for women.63
The ECHR has concluded in earlier cases that the protections afforded to
the unborn serve a “legitimate aim” and can be proportionally tailored and
necessary in a democratic society.  Even more damaging to A, B, and C’s64
claim is that Article 8 of the Convention states,
[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests [. . .] for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others.65
This provision notes that there are recognized exceptions to Article 8. The
ECHR has previously commented on its determination that the Irish protection
of the unborn qualifies as a legitimate aim, and a potential exception for the
protection of health and morals under Article 10, and presumably a potential
exception under Article 8 which mirrors its language.  The prohibition on66
abortion also falls under the last exception as it serves to protect the rights and
freedoms of the unborn who qualify as “others” under Irish law.  In ECHR67
history it is not unusual for the Court to recognize extensive exceptions to the
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68. The Court has recognized privacy exceptions with regard to physical integrity, sexual activity,
and gender rights. See, e.g., A.D.T. v. the United Kingdom, 2000-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 295; Sheffield and
Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011 (1998); Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur.
H.R. (ser. A) at 1 (1990); Rees v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1986);
McFeeley v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 161 (1980).
69. See also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 167 (1981); Handyside v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737, 49 (1976), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
ECHR/EN/hudoc.
70. Statement of Facts at Complaints, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
71. See The Attorney General v. X, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.); McGee v. The Attorney General, [1974]
I.R. 284 (Ir.); MEDICAL COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO ETHICAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR § 24.6 (2004) (“The
Council recognises that termination or pregnancy can occur when there is real and substantial risk to the
life of the mother. . . .”).
72. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 7–8, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
73. Glass v. United Kingdom, 2004-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 25, 49.
74. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to
right to privacy.  Protection of the unborn is arguably a compelling reason for68
recognition. Ultimately, the restrictive law must be held to be proportional to
the legitimate aim pursued, or “the achievement of a fair balance between the
various conflicting interests.”  Under existing ECHR case law, Ireland’s69
approach is sufficiently balanced between the competing interests.
The women also assert that the ban fails because it is imprecise in its
language and unreasonable in accommodating women’s health concerns.70
However, by relying upon and deferring to recognized and accepted medical
guidelines, the law achieves the necessary precision. Irish case law and the
Irish Medical Council guidelines both recognize that termination may occur
where the risk of death is both real and substantial.  Relying to an extent on71
a doctor’s clinical judgment as to when a particular life is in danger is more
sensible than trying to craft a legislative rule which would attempt to create
universally applicable guidelines that would work in highly individual and
unique situations.  The ECHR has recognized that “it is not its function to72
question the doctors’ clinical judgment as regards the seriousness of the first
applicant’s condition or the appropriateness of the treatment they proposed.”73
Given the specific nature of the Irish law and its accompanying medical
guidelines this challenge would seem to fail in the face of the evidence.
B. The Applicants’ Article 3 Claim Is Without Merit
Second, the women claim that the ban on abortion violates their right to
be free from inhumane and degrading treatment (Article 3) because allegedly,
women seeking abortions in Ireland are stigmatized and suffer increased
feelings of guilt, as well as difficulty securing follow-up care.  The ECHR74
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torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
75. Statement of Facts at Questions to the Parties § 4, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
76. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
3ae6b3a94.html [hereinafter CAT].
77. See id. art. 1; Akkoc v. Turkey, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 426; Salman v. Turkey, 2000-VII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 365, 400.
78. CAT, supra note 76, art. 1.
79. The Greek Case, 12 Yr. bk. Eur. Ct. of H.R. 1 (1969).
80. Tysiac v. Poland, App. No. 5410/03, 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 65 66, http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/470376112.html.
81. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 14, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05; The Greek
Case, at 196.
82. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 14–15, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
asked for clarification about any issues arising under Article 3, suggesting
perhaps that the Court found the petitioners’ complaint to be insufficient or
vague.  The petitioners are essentially claiming that the refusal of elective75
abortion services and the law protecting unborn life are tantamount to torture,
inhumane, and degrading treatment under the United Nations Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT).  Thus, upon perusal of the Convention’s definitions, it76
is readily understood why the Court requested clarification of the petitioners’
argument.
The necessary elements to constitute torture, inhumane, or degrading
treatment have been set out in the CAT and adopted by the ECHR.  The77
elements are: the infliction of severe mental or physical pain; the intentional
or deliberate infliction of pain; and the pursuit of a specific purpose such as
gaining information, punishment or intimidation.  The ECHR has expanded78
the standard of inhumane or degrading treatment to ask if the treatment was
“deliberately causing severe suffering, mental or physical, which in a
particular situation is unjustifiable.”  It is telling that the ECHR found no79
violation of Article 3 when an applicant was prevented from obtaining an
abortion by Polish law even when the result was a deterioration of the
woman’s vision.  The Court has also held “that the object of the treatment80
complained of must have as its object, the purpose of humiliation and
debasement of the applicants.”  It is difficult to find a rational argument that81
the purpose of Ireland’s pro-life policy is to humiliate or debase Irish women.
Outside of protecting the life of the mother, abortion is an elective procedure
and denial of an elective abortion should not be considered denial of essential
healthcare.  Pregnant women are not detained if they wish to travel abroad to82
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83. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.
84.
The Irish Medical Council’s Guide to Ethical Conduct and Behaviour itself makes absolutely
clear that: “we recognize our responsibility to provide aftercare for women who decide to leave
the State for termination of pregnancy. We recommend that full support and follow up services
be made available for all women whose pregnancies have been terminated, whatever the
circumstances.”
Observations of Third Party Interveners at 15 n.66, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05; MEDICAL COUNCIL,
A GUIDE TO ETHICAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR § 2.5 (2004).
85. Applicants’ Reply at 4–6, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
86. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 15, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
procure an abortion and abortion is allowed to save a mother’s life.  It is the83
official policy of medical community of Ireland to “provide abortion
aftercare.”  Thus any concerns about the availability of post abortion care in84
Ireland fail on a factual level unless evidence of a pattern of refusal of access
to such care can be established. Evidence has not shown that pattern, as even
applicants A and B admitted that they received abortion aftercare in Ireland
without any legal or criminal consequences.  Based on the above factors it is85
hard to characterize Ireland’s behavior as deliberately causing suffering with
severity or intensity. The fact that a woman feels uncomfortable pursuing the
options Ireland has provided is not justification for overturning a legal
proscription. The Intervener’s brief makes an excellent point when it states
that:
[T]o show that Ireland has the requisite intent to commit torture, inhuman or
degrading treatment, Irish authorities would at least need to be aware that a particular
woman had or is seeking an abortion. Allowing a mere omission to constitute torture
or inhuman treatment would constitute a slippery slope that inalterably undermines
the Convention and its purposes.86
The woman may feel humiliated or guilty, but Ireland’s actions do not seek to
promote or encourage her feelings of guilt and shame. Thus, its actions do not
constitute degrading or inhumane torture, and so the Article 3 claim should
also fail.
C. Applicant C’s Article 2 Claim Also Fails
Third, the allegation is brought by C alone that the ban on abortion
breaches her right to life (Article 2) because the Irish government has not
provided any clear legislation about when abortion may be legally carried out
under the exception reserved for saving the mother’s life, which placed her
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87. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 2.1 (“Everyone’s right to life shall
be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”).
88. Statement of Facts at Complaints, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
89. See Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 58.
90. See Ocalan v. Turkey, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 131, ¶ 156; Case of D. v. United Kingdom,
1997-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 777 (deciding the case under the Article 3 claim and not the Article 2 claim).
91. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.
92. See generally MEDICAL COUNCIL, A GUIDE TO ETHICAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR (2004).
“The Council recognizes the termination of pregnancy can occur when there is real and substantial risk to
the life of the mother. . . .” Id. § 24.6.
In current obstetrical practice rare complications can arise where therapeutic intervention is
required at a stage in pregnancy when there will be little or no prospect for the survival of the
baby, due to extreme immaturity. In these exceptional situations failure to intervene may result
in the death of both mother and baby. We consider that there is a fundamental difference
between abortion carried out with the intention of taking the life of the baby, for example for
social reasons, and the unavoidable death of the baby resulting from essential treatment to
protect the life of the mother.
Id. at app. C.
life in danger.  The ECHR inquired into whether any issue arose under87
Article 2 during the oral arguments.88
Under Article 2 the state has a positive obligation to provide health care
to an individual when it has undertaken to make a certain type of health care
widely available to the population.  Abortion is not provided in Ireland except89
when the life of the mother is at stake, so Ireland has no positive obligation to
provide abortion services to its citizens. The ECHR has already resolved that
negative claims that government inaction would violate a petitioner’s right to
life cannot be considered separately from an Article 3 claim.  There is clearly90
a legislative exception built into the Irish Constitution allowing doctors to
perform abortions to save the life of a mother.  This exception is invoked by91
independent medical judgment and justly recognizes that potential medical
conditions are fact specific and legislation cannot (and should not) attempt to
adequately address all possible scenarios. As such, the invocation of the
exception is appropriately left in the hands of the medical professionals who
have published guidelines on the subject.  C’s doctor could have performed92
an abortion on Irish soil if he felt it was medically necessary to save her life.
C had a range of options to choose from after her primary care physician
declined to deem the pregnancy a risk to her life.
Most importantly for C’s claim, is the reality that the ECHR has held
there is no corresponding “negative” right that goes along with the Article 2
right to life. In the framework of the euthanasia situation, the ECHR has stated
that Article 2 does not encompass a negative right.
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93. Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 155, 186.
94. R.H. v. Norway, App. No. 17004/90, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep., http://cmiskp.ec
hr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=17004/90&sessionid
=60497281&skin=hudoc-en (Court held that the Commission before its disbandment, held that the fetus
enjoys a certain minimal level of protection of the unborn under Article 2 in certain circumstances).
95. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 5, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
96. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such
as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with
The consistent emphasis in all the cases before the Court has been the obligation of
the State to protect life. The Court is not persuaded that “the right to life” guaranteed
in Article 2 can be interpreted as involving a negative aspect. While, for example in
the context of Article 11 of the Convention, the freedom of association has been
found to involve not only a right to join an association but a corresponding right not
to be forced to join an association, the Court observes that the notion of a freedom
implies some measure of choice as to its exercise [. . .]. Article 2 of the Convention
is phrased in different terms. It is unconcerned with issues to do with the quality of
living or what a person chooses to do with his or her life. To the extent that these
aspects are recognised as so fundamental to the human condition that they require
protection from State interference, they may be reflected in the rights guaranteed by
other Articles of the Convention, or in other international human rights instruments.
Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the
diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die.93
Pursuing the argument of the Court respecting Article 2, it is clear that its
language precludes the absurd result suggested by the petitioner. It would be
inappropriate for the Court to minimize the protection Ireland affords the
unborn.  Especially considering that “Convention law does not impose rigid94
standards for requirements for Member States on moral questions. It sets
certain minimal standards for the protection of fundamental human rights and
gives a wide margin of discretion to States, depending on the nature of the
right, on the nature of the issues and the importance of the issues at stake, and
on the existence or absence of consensus or international law on the topic.”95
This is a case where the court should apply the margin of appreciation
doctrine. Ireland’s treatment of women in C’s situation meets the minimal
standard of protection under Article 2 and as such her claim should be denied.
D. The Applicants Fail to Provide Evidence of the Discrimination
Necessary for an Article 14 Claim
Fourth, the women allege that Irish abortion law discriminates on the
basis of sex and financial status (Article 14).  The court wished to hear96
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4476/70–4478/70, 4486/70, 4501/70 and 4526/70–4530/70, Eur. Ct. of H.R. (1973) (unpublished),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C11
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100. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 2.
101. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 13, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
102. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.
103. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 14 (financial status is not expressly
protected under Article 14).
arguments on whether a discrimination claim could be made by a breach of
Article 14 taken with Article 8, indicating that the Article 14 claim could not
stand on its own.  Thus, the women argue that the forced travel necessary to97
obtain an elective abortion or childbirth endangers pregnant women’s lives,
and that Ireland is discriminating against them because of their financial
situation and sex.
To base their Article 8 claim on sex, the applicants would have to show
that differential treatment by the State, of individuals in similar situations, did
not have a reasonable and objective justification.  Here however, all women98
are treated similarly by Ireland. Additionally, men and women are not
similarly situated with regard to pregnancy and abortion restrictions, so it
would be difficult to argue that the differential treatment did not have a
reasonable and objective justification.
Along with the exceptions to the Article 8 claim, the ECHR also
recognizes exceptions to Article 14 where they are necessary to protect a
competing right.  Here, Ireland is exercising its right as a State to protect life99
as a matter of public policy.  Additionally, Article 14 only “complements the100
substantive provisions of the Convention. As access to abortion is not a right
guaranteed by the Convention, Article 14 is not applicable.”  Even when101
combined with Article 8 claims, any discrimination claim fails. Ireland does
have an exception which allows women to travel overseas to obtain an
abortion if they choose to avail themselves of that opportunity.  Ireland is not102
discriminating or interfering with bodily integrity when women who cannot
afford to travel carry their pregnancies to term.  Ireland has no positive duty103
to procure abortions for its citizens. As applied, the abortion prohibition “is
both uniform and even-handed, applying to unborn children without reference
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to any discrimination against women.”  The ECHR should find that a104
discrimination claim based on Article 14 falls short of meeting its burden of
proof. Along with the failure of the applicants to meet their burden of proof
on the discrimination claim, the ECHR typically affords the Council of Europe
Member States a wide margin of appreciation regarding discrimination claims,
making such deference appropriate here.105
After examining each of the claims, the alleged violations do not appear
to rise to the level where the ECHR’s intervention into Ireland’s domestic
sovereignty is necessary. Instead, Ireland seems justified under the European
Convention on Human Rights in its policies banning abortion. The hardships
caused by the ban are not disproportionate to the good Ireland views the ban
as achieving.
III. THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION AND THE
LACK OF PRECEDENT FOR IMPOSING SUCH A BURDEN ON IRELAND AND ALL
MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNSELS
STRONGLY AGAINST THE CREATION OF SUCH A RIGHT
The ECHR would be overstepping its bounds by creating an international
right to abortion for its Member States. Traditionally, the ECHR has found it
inappropriate to impose its own moral view, especially one which is contrary
to a particular moral view of a Member State, on the Member State.  In other106
words, these types of issues fall into the margin of appreciation doctrine where
the ECHR is to give deference to the Member State’s determination of public
policy on the issue.  This has been particularly true when the court has faced107
issues about when to protect the right to life. For example in Vo v. France:
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109. 505 U.S. at 979–80 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
[I]t is not only legally difficult to seek harmonization of national laws at the
Community level, but because of the lack of consensus, it would be inappropriate to
impose one exclusive moral code . . . the issue of when the right to life begins comes
within the margin of appreciation which the court generally considers that the States
should enjoy in this sphere . . . [and] the issue of such protection has not been
resolved within the majority of the Contracting States themselves . . . [and] there is
no European consensus on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of
life.108
Similar to the ECHR’s explanation about the inappropriateness of imposing
abortion or another practice on all the Member states where there is no
prevailing consensus, is Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does
not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon
it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens
trying to persuade one another and then voting. As the Court acknowledges, “where
reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other.”
Ante, 505 U.S. at 851. The Court is correct in adding the qualification that this
“assumes a state of affairs in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected
liberty,” ibid.—but the crucial part of that qualification is the penultimate word. A
State’s choice between two positions on which reasonable people can disagree is
constitutional even when (as is often the case) it intrudes upon a “liberty” in the
absolute sense. Laws against bigamy, for example—with which entire societies of
reasonable people disagree—intrude upon men and women’s liberty to marry and
live with one another. But bigamy happens not to be a liberty specially “protected”
by the Constitution.
That is, quite simply, the issue in these cases: not whether the power of a woman
to abort her unborn child is a “liberty” in the absolute sense; or even whether it is a
liberty of great importance to many women. Of course it is both. The issue is whether
it is a liberty protected by the Constitution of the United States. I am sure it is not.
I reach that conclusion not because of anything so exalted as my views concerning
the “concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.” Ibid. Rather, I reach it for the same reason I reach the conclusion that bigamy
is not constitutionally protected—because of two simple facts: (1) the Constitution
says absolutely nothing about it, and (2) the longstanding traditions of American
society have permitted it to be legally proscribed. Akron II, supra, at 520.109
Here, Justice Scalia has aptly summarized one of this paper’s main arguments.
Reasonable minds differ over the beginning of life in the countries that
comprise the Council of Europe. Once there is life, it is unquestionably
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protected by the European Convention of Human Rights.  The right to life110
has primacy over all other rights.  Ireland’s definition of life is broader than111
some Member States and that provides more people with the right to life.
Thus, analogizing Scalia’s argument to the Grand Chamber of the ECHR’s
situation, the only reason the Grand Chamber should invade Ireland’s
domestic sovereignty is if Ireland’s definition of life unreasonably intrudes
into upon a “liberty” with stronger protection under the European Convention
of Human Rights. Thus far in history, a right to abortion has never been
recognized in either the Convention or the longstanding traditions of countries
in the Council of Europe, which have long permitted abortion to be
proscribed. This decision should be left to the Member States to sort out
individually as a national matter, rather than in a single policy setting judicial
pronouncement as the United States Supreme Court arguably did in Roe v.
Wade.112
Recognizing that such a law indeed does place a burden on a woman
living in Ireland who becomes pregnant, the Irish people also subsequently
passed two additional constitutional amendments, the thirteenth  and113
fourteenth  amendments. What the Irish Constitution strives to accomplish114
is an equitable balance between the respective rights of the unborn and the
mother. The Irish formulation of that balance is something which the ECHR
should respect in the absence of a countervailing recognized international
right to abortion.
When courts look for grounds for an international right, they often look
to custom or state practice, and international treaties and conventions.  In115
cases such as these where the Member States have left the issue largely out of
international treaties and conventions, custom and state practice can also
inform treatment of the issue.
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A. Customary International Law and State Practice Do Not Provide
Grounds for Creating an International Right to Abortion
Customary international law is defined as “result[ing] from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”  Comment C to Section 102 of the Restatement further explains116
that, “[f]or a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law
it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally followed
but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute customary
law.”  Brierly further elucidates the standards by stating that:117
Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or usage; it is a
usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. There must be present a
feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of sanction probably, or at any
rate ought to, fall on the transgressor.118
A State may also avoid becoming bound by a customary international law
if it consistently opposes the rule without interruption, becoming a persistent
objector to the rule.  At this point in time, there is no general or consistent119
state practice towards abortion. Individual States do not set their abortion
policies based on a sense of legal obligation to any international customary
law. By the Center for Reproductive Rights’ (CPR) own admission, as of
2008, 68 countries worldwide prohibit abortion entirely or only allow it to
save a mother’s life.  Additionally, 35 countries allow abortion only to120
preserve the physical health of the mother.  Of the identified 196 world121
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Id. at 159.
125. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 934 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
126. 410 U.S. at 130 (Blackmun, J.) (“Ancient religion did not bar abortion.”).
nations, only 56 nations allow abortion without restriction as to the reason.122
This falls short of establishing customary international law.
Despite the requirement for custom to be the consistent and general
practice of states, courts often look to history and cite it as custom mandating
a certain resolution of the issue. Although the presentation of the history in
Roe would cause readers to believe that there had been no historical consensus
on whether the unborn was life worthy or deserving of protection, the Roe
opinion was selective in its historical presentation.  The Grand Chamber123
faces pressure today to provide a “European solution” to the issue of abortion.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided that since the status of the unborn life at
conception could not be solved, it was better to err on the side of protecting
the woman’s right to privacy, created in Griswold v. Connecticut, and in one
decision struck down all state statues criminalizing the performance and
acquiring of an abortion procedure.  This ruling left a complete void where124
any abortion procedure was permissible until state legislatures could pass new
laws complying with the decision in Roe.125
Certainly, Justice Blackmun’s presentation of the ancient history of
abortion in Roe was not entirely untrue.  Depending on how far back one126
examines history for custom or state practice to determine what the right to
life meant and how the unborn were treated, there is irrefutable evidence that
the right to life for the unborn, infants, and even adults was not always
respected. Cultures were often quite inhumane toward the unborn and
children. Yet the policies behind the denial of the right to life are now
dissonant to the ear of the modern day emerging human rights culture. The
practice and policies of these cultures are hardly supportable by the European
Court of Human Rights. Because the ideologies behind the denial can no
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longer be viewed as legitimate, the evidence that the practice occurred should
not be used to support the Court’s assumption of their role as moral arbiter
where one is not needed, thus imposing a “right” to abortion upon Ireland.
Ancient Near Eastern cultures commonly practiced child sacrifice. For
example, the Phoenician mothers placed babies, in the outstretched arms of
the Baal idol above a fire where the babies were consumed by the flames as
a sacrifice.  The Canaanites sacrificed their children in fires to their god127
Molech.  Ancient Egyptians killed their children, “disemboweling and128
dismembering them shortly after birth—their collagen was ritually harvested
for the manufacture of cosmetic creams.”  Some Polynesian cultures beat129
pregnant women’s abdomens with large stones or heaped hot coals upon
them.  In these cultures, abortion or infanticide was not only allowed, but in130
some cases it was required or government mandated. It would be assumed that
those who identify themselves as pro-choice would be hostile to any such
government mandated abortions or judicial credence given to the ancient
cultures permitting abortions as grounds for creating an international right to
abortion.
While early western liberal tradition, founded in the Enlightenment
period, highly regarded the ancient Greek society, the Classical world fails to
provide a strong modern day argument for the creation of an international
legalization of abortion. Indeed, “[t]he murder of new-born infants was a
practice allowed in almost all of the states of Greece.”  It can also fairly be131
alleged that the majority of the ancient Greeks permitted and promoted
abortions. Plato himself sometimes permitted abortion, and indeed in his ideal
society it would be required for women over the age of forty, although he
recognized that the fetus was indeed a human being.  The intellectual origins132
of the Chinese “one child policy” as a zero-population growth policy to avoid
overcrowding can be found in Aristotle’s Politics where he “required abortion
before ‘quickening,’ whenever the number of state-permitted births became
exceeded.”  The Classical support for abortion was decidedly in opposition133
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to the contemporary American notions of “privacy” as a space outside of
governmental regulation. Both Aristotle and Plato espoused the philosophy
that “the state’s ideals and needs take precedence over the life and rights of
the unborn” or infants and as such, the state could rightly determine the
appropriate time to abort the life of the unborn.  Plato and Aristotle’s134
subsequent disregard of the lives of the unborn comes from their utilitarian
belief of a human’s purpose. In their eyes, each individual existed solely for
the state, absolute rights did not exist, and even the right to life would be
sacrificed if the best interests of the state demanded it.  In general, most135
Europeans, even if they deny the unborn child’s right to life, are solidly in
favor of the absoluteness of their own right to life and thus would be
disingenuous in relying on Plato or Aristotle’s permission of abortion for
support of the creation of a right to abortion. Certainly the Grand Chamber of
the ECHR could not rely on the ancient custom to strike down Ireland’s statute
without simultaneously eliminating A, B, and C’s individual right to life under
Article 2.
The oft admired Pagan Roman Empire was no more sympathetic toward
the unborn and even infants. Abortion was not usually regarded as being
contrary to “Roman Moral Law” in Ancient Pagan Rome.  The earliest136
Roman law code, the Twelve Tables, allowed a father to abandon to the
elements any female infant or a deformed infant of either sex.  Seneca,137
writing before 65 A.D., defended the drowning of deformed babies.  In the138
Roman Republic, the father known as the Partria had the power of life and
death over all inside his household, men, women, and children therefore any
prohibitions against abortion derived from a view of it as an offense against
the potential father.  Surely A, B, and C could not allege a violation of their139
human rights with the above theory.
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What of the great Roman Empire? Motives for abortion varied during the
Roman age, but many are shared by our own age. Some of the rich did not
want to share their wealth with illegitimate children.  Beautiful women140
practiced abortion to preserve their sex-appeal.  The Roman poor felt unable141
to support many children.  There is even a record of a woman aborting a142
baby after a divorce so she would not be reminded of the man she hated.143
Abortion was seen, much as it is today, as a corrective for failed
contraceptives.  The Roman Pagan writer Quintillian (A.D. 40–118) wrote,144
“[t]o kill one’s own children is sometimes considered a beautiful action,
among the Romans.”  Even as late as 210 A.D., historians recorded many145
examples of feticide and infanticide occurring in the Roman Empire.  King146
Herod the Idumaean ordered the deaths of all male children under the age of
two in Bethlehem in an attempt to eliminate a perceived threat to his throne.147
Even as the Empire became more pro family under Octavian or Caesar
Augustus, abortion was not forbidden because Roman law had borrowed from
the Greek Stoics’ view that the unborn was not human.  Consequently148
following such a view, the laws against abortion which were in existence seem
to have been mostly directed at punishing a woman for depriving her husband
of children and for curbing a bad example of negating the maternal instinct.149
The Roman view of a human’s purpose was similar to that of Plato and
Aristotle, as one historian observes that, “even when born, the child was
valued primarily not for itself but for its usefulness to the father, the family,
and especially the state, as a citizen ‘born for the state.’”  Laws remained lax150
against abortion until Constantine and the advent of the Christian Roman
Empire.
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When considering the downright cruelty shown towards the unborn and
infants in the Ancient world, one inescapable difference remains. Ireland,
England, America, and most of the region addressed by the European
Convention of Human Rights, as we understand the countries today, were not
founded on Assyrian, Canaanite, or the utilitarian Greek and Roman
worldviews but on Western, unmistakably Judeo-Christian, and Enlightenment
premises.  Men did not exist solely for the state; rather the state existed for151
men. The Declaration of Independence declared that man possesses absolute
“unalienable” rights, the Bill of Rights plainly delineated some of them and,
as in the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to life was one of
the first mentioned.  Hopefully, one would be laughed out of court if he or152
she attempted to legitimize a challenge to a statute forbidding infanticide on
the grounds that the ancient Canaanite practice of burning their firstborn
meant that the Council of Europe should not have a ban on the practice. One
might assume that if the judges were going to base their decision on historical
custom they should place more weight on the historical view that the Jews,
Christians, Constantine’s Roman Empire, and English Common Law recorder
William Blackstone have taken on the importance and sanctity of human life.
Contrary to Justice Blackmun’s presentation of the history in Roe, the
judiciary was not always so disinclined or confused on how to define
personhood. As early as 1795, an English court interpreted the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘children’ in a will, to include a child still in the
womb.  Consistently, the court continued to declare, as in Thelluson v.153
Woodford,  that unborn children, as such, are entitled to all the privileges of154
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155. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446–47 (emphasis added).
156. LEE, supra note 133, at 272.
157. Id.; de Freitas & Finney, supra note 10, at 33–34.
158. Offenses Against the Person Act, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 100, §§ 58–59 (1861), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/legis/num_act/1861/ukpga_18610100_en.pdf (stating that a woman who
“[i]nten[ded] to procure her own Miscarriage . . . [or] whosoever . . . shall unlawfully administer to her . . .
shall be guilty of Felony . . .” and those who “supply or procure any Poison or other noxious Thing, or any
Instrument . . . knowing that the same is intended . . . to procure the Miscarriage of any Woman . . . shall
be guilty of a Misdemeanor . . . .”).
159. Editor in Chief of the American Trial Lawyers’ Association, 1955–1972.
160. LEE, supra note 133, at 272; de Freitas & Finney, supra note 10, at 33–34.
other persons. William Blackstone’s 1809 commentaries explain that not only
do children have rights, but that parents have duties toward their offspring:
The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children, is a principle
of natural law; an obligation laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own
proper act, in bringing them into the world: for they would be in the highest manner
injurious to their issue, if they only gave their children life, that they might
afterwards see them perish. By begetting (conceiving) them therefore, they have
entered into a voluntary obligation, to endeavour, so far as in them lies, that the life
which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved. And thus the children
will have a perfect right of receiving maintenance from their parents.155
A critic might object, stating that this protection was in place in England
before pregnancies were properly understood by science. However, the
protection increased as science made advances.
As science made advances, laws in Ireland, England, and America kept
pace with the discoveries. For example, “after the discovery of the human
ovum in 1827, the British Parliament in 1837 enacted a new abortion statute
effectively protecting unborn children even from the moment of
conception.”  A New York Statute of 1829 made it a crime of manslaughter156
“for any abortionist who caused the death of a quickened child unless the
reason was to preserve the life of the mother.”  These statutes indicate that157
the United States considered it necessary to keep abortion illegal and that they
placed value on the unborn. In Ireland, providing or obtaining an abortion has
been unlawful since the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861.  Thomas158
F. Lambert Jr.  wrote in 1968 an article titled, The Legal Rights of the Fetus,159
about the legal rights the fetus possessed from conception. In this regard,
Lambert referred to the 1946 case, Bonbrest v. Kotz.  There the district court160
held that “a child born alive and viable should be allowed to maintain an
action in the courts for injuries wrongfully committed upon its person while
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161. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1948) (In that the case the injury was brain
damage caused by an obstetrician.).
162. de Freitas & Finney, supra note 10, at 33–34. See Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. at 140–41;
Timothy F. Lambert, Legal Rights of the Fetus, 1 THE CHRISTIAN LAWYER 23, 26 (1968).
163. 164 A.2d 93, 96 (Pa. 1960).
164. de Freitas & Finney, supra note 10, at 34.
165. Hippocratic Oath, quoted in LEE, supra note 133, at 278; de Freitas & Finney, supra note 10,
at 34.
166. See Dique, referenced in LEE, supra note 133, at 278. In 1948, the Declaration of Geneva was
adopted by the General Assembly of the World Medical Organization, and began to be used in medical
school graduation ceremonies. The new Declaration contained less of an adamant rejection of abortion
stating simply: “I will maintain the utmost respect for human life—from the time of conception. Even under
threat, I will not use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.” Id.
167. Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 49 (1976), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Case|of|Han
dyside|The|United|Kingdom&sessionid=60924649&skin=hudoc-en; Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App.
No. 7525/76, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 60, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=
hbkm&action=html&highlight=Dudgeon|United|Kingdom&sessionid=61039962&skin=hudoc-en (1981).
168. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 8, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (“In addition to
Ireland, 68 countries worldwide prohibit abortion entirely or allow it only to save the mother’s life. This
includes Malta, Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra which are also signatories to the Convention.”); see also
in the womb of its mother.”  The district court “persuasively reasoned that161
the unborn child was a separate biological (and hence legal) entity from the
mother.”  In Sinkler v. Kneale,  Justice Bok wrote that “[m]edical162 163
authorities have long recognized that a child was in existence from the
moment of conception”—in existence as an individual human being distinct
from his or her mother, “and not merely a part of its mother’s body” until
some unspecified time after conception.”164
As Justice Bok alluded to the medical field also provided historical
grounds for opposing the legalization of abortion. The original Hippocratic
Oath required doctors to swear: “I will not give to a woman a pessary to
produce abortion.”  It was not until the early nineteen-sixties that the165
Hippocratic Oath underwent a revision which removed the clause about
abortion.166
At the time Roe was decided States had begun individually addressing
and experimenting with various strengths of abortions statues. Change was
occurring slowly. The benefits of federalism were being achieved by using the
states as microcosms in which to experiment with varying approaches to the
law. This is an opportunity that the Council of Europe Member States could
still reap the benefit from and one which is compatible with the ECHR’s
margin of appreciation doctrine.  Most of the states allow abortions in167
certain circumstances or with different restrictions, several like Ireland
provide for it only in the case of protecting the life of the mother.  Allowing168
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Polish Abortion Case, Constitutional Court of Poland, OTK Z.U. z.r. 1997, Nr. 2, 19; MEDICAL COUNCIL,
A GUIDE TO ETHICAL CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR, APPX. (2004) (“In current obstetrical practice rare
complications can arise where therapeutic intervention is required at a stage in pregnancy when there will
be little or no prospect for the survival of the baby, due to extreme immaturity. In these exceptional
situations failure to intervene may result in the death of both mother and baby. We consider that there is
a fundamental difference between abortion carried out with the intention of taking the life of the baby, for
example for social reasons, and the unavoidable death of the baby resulting from essential treatment to
protect the life of the mother.”); INSTITUTE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, WRITTEN
SUBMISSION OF THE INSTITUTE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS TO THE ALL-PARTY OIREACHTAS
COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, as contained in its Fifth Progress Report, app. IV, at A407.
169. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 42, at pmbl. (“Whereas recognition of
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”); Vo v. France, App. No. 53924/00 § 24.1,
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=53924/00&
sessionid=60548338&skin=hudoc-e (2004) (holding by the ECHR “that the embryo/foetus belongs to the
human race.”); see, e.g., Observations of Third Party Interveners at 3, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05
(“The right to protection of the unborn is also a fundamental component of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) to which Ireland is a signatory. Under the UNCRC, the child has the
right to life, Parties are obliged to ensure their survival ‘to the maximum extent possible,’ and the child
deserves special care and legal protection ‘before as well as after birth.’”); United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, supra note 42, at pmbl., arts. 3, 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 42 (protecting pregnant women from capital punishment by Article 6 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which serves to preserve the unborn child’s life.); Observations of
Third Party Interveners at 3, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (“The Commission on European Human
Rights determined that the fetus has the benefit of certain protection under the first sentence of Article 2
of the European Convention of Human Rights.”); R.H. v. Norway, App. No. 17004/90, Eur. Ct. of H.R.
(May 19, 1990), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight
these different approaches to be tried and tweaked will result in a better grasp
on which policies are successful, and as the national governments
understandably have more control over their own laws, they would prefer to
be allowed the freedom to experiment.
B. International Conventions/Treaties
The next place to search for binding international law is in treaties or
conventions. When the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), and
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) are examined, one of the things they have in common is that none
have been interpreted to encompass a right to abortion. Indeed, language in a
few of the above documents could be interpreted to hold that the unborn are
protected.  Even attorneys for the Center for Reproductive Rights arguing169
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=17004/90&sessionid=60497281&skin=hudoc-en.
170. Christina Zampas & Jamie M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—International and Regional
Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 252 (2008); The African Union Convention on Protocol to the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa known as the Maputo
Protocol, is “the only legally binding human rights instrument that explicitly addresses abortion as a human
right.” Id. at 250.
171. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
172. It is interesting to note that the one regional treaty that mentions “medical abortion” the African
Union Convention on the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of
Women in Africa has not been ratified by half of the countries which signed it. http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/Protocol%20on%20the%20Rights%20of%20Women.pdf.
173. UNCRC, supra note 169, art. 1; For more information on the Convention of the Rights of the
Child see Frequently Asked Questions on the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the UNICEF
website, http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last accessed Sept. 25, 2010).
174. UNCRC, supra note 169, art. 6.
vigorously that access to abortion is a human right, admit that the right cannot
be found in binding treaty law with a single regional exception.170
The first rule of treaty interpretation is found in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which states, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”  The word171
abortion cannot be found in any global United Nation’s treaty.  Nor can a172
right to abortion be inferred from the ordinary meaning given to any global
United Nation’s treaty in light of the treaties object and purpose. For example,
when looking at the context around the drafting of such documents as the
UDHR, ICCPR, CEDAW, and the UNCRC, one notices that many of the
drafting and signatory countries had laws forbidding abortion. There is no
indication that the countries intended to alter their domestic laws on the
subject by ratifying the above treaties, as they have for the most part kept their
laws protecting unborn life or criminalizing abortion unaffected. Besides the
context, when reading the plain language of the treaties, it is often easier to
reconcile the language of the documents with protections for the unborn than
the creation of a right to abortion. As an illustration, the UNCRC, which has
been ratified by every country but the United States and Somalia, defines a
child in Article 1 as “every human being below the age of eighteen.”  This173
importantly declares nothing about the minimum age of the child, simply
defining the maximum age. Article 6 guarantees all children under the
UNCRC “the inherent right to life” and impose on States a responsibility to
ensure “the survival and development of the child.”  Although a preamble174
is not binding law, the Vienna Convention allows preambles to constitute part
of the context in determining the meaning of provisions, and the preamble to
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175. Vienna Convention, supra note 171, art. 31; UNCRC, supra note 169, pmbl.
176. See Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 61,
at § 8.25.
177. Id. § 8.25; Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action, 106(k), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20.
178. See Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, supra note 61,
at § 8.25.
179. Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, 59 FIRST THINGS 30, 30 (1996).
the UNCRC recognizes a child as needing legal protection, “before as well as
after birth.”175
Abortion advocates have attempted, without success, to get a right to
abortion incorporated to some of the above mentioned treaties. Specifically
there was debate about the issue at the 1994 International Conference on
Population and Development in Cairo and at the 1995 World Conference on
Women. The effort failed, and neither the Cairo Programme of Action nor the
Beijing Platform of Action of 1995 produced from those conferences contains
a right to abortion. These documents are not binding in international law, but
it is telling that the strongest statement pro-choice advocates were able to
wrangle from the conferences was that “where abortion is not against the law,
such abortion should be safe.”  The Cairo Programme of Action and the176
Beijing Platform of Action also lend credence to the margin of appreciation
of the ECHR when they state, “any measures or changes related to abortion
within the health system can only be determined at the national or local level
according to the national legislative process.  Mary Ann Glendon, the177
Learned Hand Professor of Law at Harvard, found it striking that the
Programme of Action rather than treating abortion as a right, asked
governments to seek to “reduce the recourse to abortion,” “eliminate the need
for abortion” and strive to “avoid repeat abortions.”  In contrast to this178
treatment of abortion she observes, “[o]ne would hardly say of an important
right like free speech, for example, that governments should reduce it,
eliminate the need for it, and help avoid its repetition.”  The ECHR would179
have to fashion the right out of whole cloth.
IV. IRELAND’S PERSONAL HISTORIC COMMITMENT TO PROTECTION OF THE
UNBORN AND ITS RESERVATION TO THE LISBON TREATY TO ENSURE THAT
ITS POLICY WOULD CONTINUE AS IRELAND FUNCTIONED AS A MEMBER OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INDICATES THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE LEFT
TO THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE
Ireland has long demonstrated a strong, consistent, persistent commitment
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180. See supra note 66 for a discussion of Ireland’s consistent and persistent commitment to
protecting the unborn; for information on the low mortality rate see http://www.irishhealth.com/
index.html?level=4&id=13789 and Reardon et al., supra note 62, at 279, available at http://
www.afterabortion.org/research/DeathsAssocWithAbortionJCHLP.pdf.
181. Treaty of London, Statute of Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, C.E.T.S 001. At the time,
countries were concerned with making sure horrible violations of human rights never occurred again, and
international documents were being drafted which would expand protections of these human rights. Few
if any countries permitted abortion. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 58
(1992) (Abortion had been legalized in Russia in 1920 under Lenin, but Stalin outlawed it again in 1936.);
Nazi Germany permitted abortions during the 1930’s–40’s and sterilization for those deemed “hereditarily
ill” while Aryan women were specifically prohibited from obtaining abortions. Id. at 59. Mexico legalized
abortion in the case of rape in 1931. KRISTEN OLSEN, CHRONOLOGY OF WOMEN’S HISTORY 232 (1994).
On July 11, 1932 Poland legalized abortion in cases of rape and threats to maternal health, ABORTION
POLICIES: A GLOBAL REVIEW VOLUME III OMAN TO ZIMBABWE 38 (United Nations 2002). In 1938, Sweden
legalized abortion on a limited basis in Sweden. Id. at 115. On January 28, 1935 Iceland became the first
Western country to legalize therapeutic abortion under limited circumstances. ABORTIONS: WEBSTER’S
QUOTATIONS, FACTS, AND PHRASES 102 (ICON Group International, Inc. 2008). In 1948 the Eugenic
Protection Act in Japan expanded the circumstances in which abortion was allowed. ABORTION POLICIES:
A GLOBAL REVIEW VOLUME II GABON TO NORWAY 79 (United Nations 2001).
182. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40.
183. Treaty on European Union (Treaty on Maastricht), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/tif/JOC_1992_191__1_EN_ 0001.pdf (“Nothing in the
Treaty on European Union, or in the Treaties establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or
Acts modifying or supplementing those Treaties, shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3.
of the Constitution of Ireland.”).
184. See MILLWARD BROWN IMS, POST LISBON TREATY REFERENDUM RESEARCH FINDINGS ii, iii
(2008), available at http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Publications/Post%20Lisbon%20Treaty%
20Referendum%20Research%20Findings/post%20lisbon%20treaty%20referendum%20research%20fin
dings_sept08.pdf; see also Dep’t of Foreign Affairs [Ir.], white paper: An Explanation of Changes to the
to the protection of the unborn and while protecting the unborn maintains the
lowest maternal mortality rate of all Europe.  When in the wake of World180
War II, Ireland signed the Treaty of London, creating the Council of Europe
on May 9, 1949, Ireland could not have envisioned membership in such
Council calling into question the legitimacy of Ireland’s protection of the
unborn.  In the intervening time period between the creation of the Council181
of Europe and the advent of the European Union, some countries began to
liberalize abortion restrictions. As is recited earlier in this article, Ireland’s
response to this new dynamic was to pass their constitutional amendment
protecting unborn life.  Ireland has remained committed to the protection of182
the unborn. Ireland’s moral view on the prohibition of abortion is so fervent
that when Ireland ratified the Treaty on the European Union in 1992, voters
had to have a protocol explicitly protecting Ireland’s constitutional
amendment.  Ireland maintained their commitment to protecting unborn life183
when they made sure that the same protocol applied to the new treaty
obligations created in the Treaty of Lisbon.184
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Functioning of the European Union made by the Lisbon Treaty 35 (2009), available at
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/EU%20Division/EU%20Reform%20Treaty/white%20paper%20-
%20final%20-%20low%20res%20from%20printers%20-%20020709.pdf.
185. DECISION OF THE HEADS OF STATE OF GOVERNMENT OF THE 27 MEMBER STATES OF THE EU,
MEETING WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, ON THE CONCERNS OF THE IRISH PEOPLE ON THE TREATY OF
LISBON, Treaty of Lisbon, Annex 1, Nov. 25, 2009, at 1.
186. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 15, art. 53 (Parties to the Convention are
free and encouraged to provide a higher level of protection of human rights in their own national
legislation.).
187. Id. art. 35 (“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”).
Nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon attributing legal status to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, or in the provisions of that Treaty in the area of
Freedom, Security and Justice affects in any way the scope and applicability of the
protection of the right to life in Article 40.3.1, 40.3.2 and 40.3.3, the protection of
the family in Article 41 and the protection of the rights in respect of education in
Articles 42 and 44.2.4 and 44.2.5 provided by the Constitution of Ireland.185
The Treaty of Lisbon addresses the European Union and not the Council of
Europe and as such, has no legal force in limiting the ECHR’s jurisdiction
over Ireland on the abortion issue. However, it still illustrates the value that
Ireland places on unborn life. It would seem ironic if a treaty Ireland signed
51 years ago, never expecting it to create a limitation on a fundamental human
right, would now tell Ireland it must obey by the Grand Chamber’s ruling and
use Ireland to create precedent for an international right to abortion, when
Ireland has so clearly made its views on the subject known with its reservation
to the Treaty of Lisbon. This would seem to be an area where the ECHR could
conclude that Ireland’s constitutional amendment reflects the principle that
Ireland has chosen to extend a higher level of protection of human rights in its
national legislation than is required to by the European Convention on Human
Rights and thus the ECHR should give Ireland’s policy determination
deference according to the margin of appreciation doctrine.186
V. PROCEDURAL BARRIERS TO ACCEPTING THE CASE
Notwithstanding all the ways the case fails on the merits, procedurally
speaking it never should have ended up before the ECHR. The European
Convention on Human Rights clearly specifies that applicants should look first
to their own domestic courts for remedies before applying to the ECHR. The
admissibility criteria for cases are set forth in Article 35 of the Convention.187
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188. Id. (“The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this Article.
It may do so at any stage of the proceedings.”).
189. Statement of Facts at Questions to the Parties, § 1, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
190. D. v. Ireland, App. No. 26499/02, § 85 (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int.
191. Holland v. Ireland, App. No. 24827/94, 93-A Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 15 (1998); Indep.
News and Media and Indep. Newspapers (Ireland) Ltd. v. Ireland, App. No. 55120/00 (2003),
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=55120&ses
sionid=61044462&skin=hudoc-en; cf. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 1, A., B. and C., App. No.
25579/05.
192. D. v. Ireland, App. No. 26499/02, § 85 (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int; cf. Observations of
Third Party Interveners at 1, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
193. Att’y Gen. v. X. and Others, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.).
194. Id. (“Walsh J., stated as follows at pp. 318–19 of the report:—. . . . According to the preamble,
Based on Article 35.1, A, B and C should have begun the procedure in the
Irish court system. Neither A, B nor C filed a single piece of paper with an
Irish court about their claims. According to Article 35.4, the applicants remain
in danger of having their case thrown out at any point before a judgment is
handed down, even after the hearing has taken place.  Indeed, the Grand188
Chamber recognizes the procedural defect in the first question it asked the
parties to prepare for oral arguments inquiring, “Have the applicants
exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 of the Convention?”189
This is not the first time the Court has been faced with examining
Ireland’s constitutional amendment protecting unborn life. In a 2006
admissibility decision, the ECHR held that the most important way to assert
and vindicate constitutional rights would be in the Irish judicial system.190
They have made similar decisions in other cases alleging similar violations of
Irish constitutional rights.  Essentially, the applicants must have exhausted191
their domestic remedies to the Court’s satisfaction before the Grand Chamber
will look any further into the substantive portion of the case.
Applicants should not be confused on what would qualify as an
exhaustion of domestic remedies in the Irish Court system. In denying the
application for D. v. Ireland, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
“a declaratory action before the Member State’s High Court, with a possibility
of an appeal to the Supreme Court, constitutes the most appropriate method
under Irish Law of seeking” relief.192
The Irish court has looked at cases which attempt to appropriately balance
the right of the unborn child to life with the right of the mother to her own
bodily integrity.  The Irish courts have repeatedly held that no single193
interpretation of the constitution is meant to be final for all time, and therefore
A, B, and C’s chances of succeeding on their claim would not be precluded by
prior precedent.  Indeed, in the Att’y Gen. v. X case where the Irish court was194
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the people gave themselves the Constitution to promote the common good, with due observance of
prudence, justice and charity so that the dignity and freedom of the individual might be assured. The judges
must, therefore, as best they can from their training and their experience interpret these rights in accordance
with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity. It is but natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas
of these virtues may be conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution is intended
to be final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas and concepts” (quoting McGee v. Att’y
Gen., [1971] 1 I.R. 284 (Ir.))); Observations of Third Party Interveners at 1, A., B. and C., App. No.
25579/05.
195. Att’y Gen. v. X. and Others, [1992] 1 I.R. 1 (Ir.); cf. Observations of Third Party Interveners at
1, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
196. Applicant’s Reply to the Observations of Ireland on the Admissibility and Merits, at §§ 58–63,
A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/5 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 23, 2008). A similar argument was made
by the applicant and lost in D. v. Ireland, App. No. 26499/02 (2006), http://www.echr.coe.int.
197. Cf. X v. Belgium, App. No. 1488/62, 13 COLLECTION OF DECISIONS 93, 96; Observations of
Third Party Interveners at 2, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
198. Statement of Facts at The Facts, § (B)(5), A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (stating that the
Constitutional Review Group issued a report in 1996 considering amending Article 40.3.3 to allow abortion
in certain limited Constitutionally defined circumstances); The interdepartmental Working Group Green
Paper on Abortion from September 1999 was submitted by the government to a committee on the
Constitution which proposed possible options for the resolution of the dissatisfaction of both prolife and
prochoice factions within Ireland. Id. § 6. In 2000, a Fifth progress report was released which agreed to
create an agency that would help to provide contraceptive services, offer services which would decrease the
presented with a fourteen-year-old rape victim, the justice noted that using
those type of interpreting principles were “peculiarly appropriate and
illuminating in the interpretation of a sub-section of the constitution which
deals with the intimate human problem of the right of the unborn to life and
its relationship to the right of the mother of an unborn child to her life.”195
However, A, B, and C did not submit their cases individually or collectively
to any court in the Irish legal system. They did not give the Irish judicial
system the chance to offer an adequate resolution of the issues. They also did
not create a record for the ECHR to review.
Of course the European Convention also provides protections for citizens
who can show exceptional circumstances that would justify the immediate
filing of an application directly to the ECHR. The burden for using this
procedural absolution has historically been very high. A, B, and C allege that
they would not be successful in a domestic remedy even with the ability to
protect their identities with in camera proceedings.  Again, the Court has196
continually held “that legal advice as to the possibility of success before
national courts does not constitute a valid excuse for not exhausting a
particular remedy.”  Taking the Statement of Facts in the case seriously, it197
is also clear that the tension between the women’s rights and the unborn’s
rights are being examined and dealt with on a fairly regularly basis internally
in Ireland.  This constant reexamination by the courts, legislatures, and198
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desire for abortions, and providing post abortion counseling and medical checkups for women who do
choose to travel abroad to obtain an abortion. Id. § 6. Finally, in 2002, a proposed amendment to the
Constitution attempted to legalize abortions inside Ireland if they were conducted at specific facilities when
necessary to prevent a risk of loss of the women’s life, but the risk was not suicide. The proposal was
narrowly defeated by a margin of 50.42% to 49.58% in favor. Id. § 8. For the ECHR to impose abortion
on a country who is close to deciding that in certain circumstances abortions may be medically necessary
seems to do it a profound disservice. The country is painstakingly considering the rights of all its citizens
not denying them any chance of relief. An imposition from an outside source could result in a violent
backlash of regulations and protests which would upset this delicate balance.
199. Observations of Third Party Interveners at 2, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05.
200. It is true that each Member State of the European Union has voluntarily chosen to relinquish a
portion of their domestic sovereignty. Many as Ireland did expressed specific reservations to the Treaty of
Lisbon which dictated what was outside the reach of the European Union, despite the Member States receipt
of the benefits of the European Union. For the ECHR to expand beyond its mandate, which requires the
cases to go through the domestic court systems, would be taking a piece of domestic sovereignty away from
the Member States that they had not [page break] contracted away; see Observations of Third Party
Interveners at 3, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (“[t]he Principle of respect for National Sovereignty, and
not the erosion thereof, forms the basis for Convention rights themselves, because those rights stemmed
from the treaty obligations undertaken by the High Contracting parties. For any organ of the Council of
Europe to hold that Ireland’s laws protecting life must be liberalised would create a new Convention right
to which Ireland never acceded, and would place obligations on Ireland to which it never became a party.”).
201. It is possible that Grand Chamber retained the case despite its procedural defect, due to another
sovereign nation, Lithuania, intervening in the case. Lithuania filed a brief requesting clarification on a
Council of Europe Resolution regarding abortion. Observations, submitted by the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania, A., B. & C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05 (E.C.H.R. Nov. 14, 2008). There is some
confusion over whether the Lithuanian official who submitted the brief was correctly authorized by the
Lithuania government to do so, since Lithuania opposed and voted against the resolution. There is
speculation that the brief may be withdrawn by the Lithuanian Government and at this time the Lithuanian
Conference of Catholic Bishops is negotiating unofficially with the Lithuanian Government. See Audre
Srebaliene, Po aborto lietuve kovoja Strasbure, LRYTAS.LT, Sept. 29, 2010, at http://m.lrytas.lt/?data=
20100929&id=akt29_a4100929&view=2.
indeed by the people through proposed referendums to the constitution
presents the applicants plenty of domestic options to vindicate their claimed
rights and to persuade Ireland to consider their opinions.
In deeming the application admissible and holding a hearing in A., B. and
C. v. Ireland, the Court has taken a step towards allowing the marginalization
of all of its Member States domestic courts. This lowering of the standard
typically applied to Article 35 should cause Member States of the Council of
Europe to consider how dearly they hold onto their domestic sovereignty.199
For indeed, such a blow to the relevance of each State’s respective domestic
legal system is an attack, or at least diminution, of one of the founding
principles of International Law: domestic sovereignty.  Procedurally200
speaking, if the court wished to avoid judicial activism it should have turned
away A, B, and C’s application until after they had litigated their claims
through the Irish Court System.201
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Center).
210. Parental Consent, Spousal Notification, Conscientious Objectors, Partial Birth-Abortion,
whether abortion should be funded by Medicare, whether the Universal Health Care Bill should cover
VI. LESSONS LEARNED: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE/EXPERIMENT
Even when dealing with abortion on an international level, it is
appropriate to also examine the United States situation, as its judges have
often been on the forefront of the legal issue. Also, American jurisprudence
on the unborn has been infectious, influencing the course of abortion
jurisprudence in a number of other countries.202
Professor Noonan  succinctly summarized the American situation in203
1982: “By virtue of [the U.S. Supreme Court’s] opinions, human life has less
protection in the United States than any country of the Western World.”204
Because of the combination of two decisions handed down together in 1973
(Roe v. Wade  and Doe v. Bolton ), the United States Senate Judiciary205 206
Committee concluded that, “no significant legal barriers of any kind
whatsoever exist today in the United States for a woman to obtain an abortion
for any reason during any stage of her pregnancy.”  The Justices have207
decided that it is up to every individual to decide whether the unborn deserves
a chance at life because, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Since 1973,208
Americans struggling to define the mystery of human life have remained
deeply divided on the issue.  Despite the Court’s sanction of the woman’s209
right to choose, numerous battles continue to rage in the courts over the issue
or the implementation of the right.  Thus, 37 years after the decision in Roe,210
2010] SHIFTING TOWARDS A EUROPEAN ROE v. WADE? 429
abortion, etc. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (determining the Constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment); Alpha Med. Clinic v. Anderson, 128 P.3d 364, 373 (Kan. 2006) (prosecuting Planned
Parenthood for failure to report suspected child sex abuse even though they are a mandatory reporter);
Tucson Women’s Clinic v. Eden, 371 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing abortion clinic regulations);
Cenzon-Decarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., No. 09 CV 3120 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2010) (discussing a NY nurse
forced to assist in an abortion); Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008) case
challenging an informed consent statute).
211. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 450 U.S. at 867 (“Where, in the performance of its judicial
duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy
reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the
normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever the Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting
a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”).
212. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06 (2009) (holding that Italian public schools could not display
crucifixes in the classroom) (referred to the Grand Chamber, heard March 1, 2010); Sahin v. Turkey, App.
No. 44774/98, § 16 (2005) (holding by the Grand Chamber that Turkey was allowed to ban Islamic
headscarves in public schools). The decisions caused much unrest and several protests.
213. William Saunders, A.B.C. v. Ireland, THE CATHOLIC THING (Dec. 15, 2009), http://
www.thecatholicthing.org/columns/2009/abc-v-ireland.html (William Saunders is a graduate of Harvard
Law School and Senior Vice President of Legal Affairs at Americans United for Life).
unlike what Justice Sandra Day O’Connor tried to accomplish in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, the Supreme Court’s decision did
not settle or put an end to the controversy.  It is equally unlikely that the211
forcible implementation of an international right to abortion in Europe would
quickly solve the problems the women in A., B. and C. v. Ireland are worried
about.
VII. CONCLUSION: RESTRAINT! THE COURT SHOULD RESPECT IRELAND’S
DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY AND REFRAIN FROM FASHIONING A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO ABORTION OF ITS OWN INITIATIVE
The Court faces an important choice with this case. It would be breaking
new ground if it made the decision to overrule Ireland’s constitutional
amendment and intrude into Ireland’s domestic realm. One of the consulting
attorneys in the case even predicts that another  perceived activist decision212
“could be the demise of the ECHR,” and could cause the Member States to
lose confidence in the Court.  The attack on Ireland’s domestic sovereignty213
could be perceived as an attack on all Members States’ ability to control their
own affairs which could have repercussions for the functioning of the
European Union.
Ireland’s definition of life expands protection for those genetically
human. As this is an expansion in keeping with the move toward universal
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214. The Court would actually appear to be violating Article 53 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (“Safeguard for existing human rights—Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under
the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.”); Observations
of Third Party Interveners at 3-4, A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05 (“Parties to the Convention are free and
encouraged to provide a higher level of protection of human rights in their own national legislation [. . .]
The Protection of life from its beginning in Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution simply constitutes a
higher level of implementation of Article 2.”).
215. After this article was accepted for publication the ECHR released its decision in the case on
December 16, 2010. The decision instructs Ireland to legislate on when a doctor is permitted to perform an
abortion because of a threat to the life of the mother. Ireland’s position and legislation on abortion was
found to be within the margin of appreciation doctrine. The text of the decision is available at
http://www.eclj.org.
human rights, etc. rather than a limitation or deprivation of rights, the Grand
Chamber should uphold Ireland’s constitutional amendment protecting unborn
life. The hardships the women face do not rise to a level which violates their
basic Human Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
However, the ECHR does not even need to rule on the merits of any of the
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights claims, but could
choose to dismiss the case due to the case’s blatant procedural defects.
Creating an international right to abortion for the European Continent would
be an overreaching act of judicial activism that would limit the restrictions
countries could put on abortions and invalidate many laws already in
existence, and would have limited expansion of the rights the ECHR was
created to protect.  The ECHR should use restraint and allow Ireland to214
exercise its own domestic power as it considers the issue, rather than choosing
to intervene with Ireland’s domestic policy and overturn a constitutional
amendment put in place by referendum in 1983, forever irrevocably altering
Ireland’s prolife policies, and simultaneously creating precedent for an
international right to abortion for all Council of Europe Member States.215
